fect markets and in extensions designed to stre modeling more realistic circumstances. Included studies involving disputes with as many as thir putes where the parties had less-than-perfect inf
The original Hoffman and Spitzer experimenta briefly summarized here, informed two subjects number and that, depending on which number would pay each of them some money in cash. Ta chart. Spitzer and Hoffman constructed the payo of the subjects were completely opposed; any ch that increased the payoff to one subject would de other. The outcome number was chosen by desig jects as the "controller." The controller could ch number he or she wished. However, the other s persuade the controller to enter into a contract, number chosen and any reallocation of payoff m the other.
The Coase Theorem predicts that subjects will agree to choose the joint-profit-maximizing outcome number3 regardless of whether A or B is the controller. Subjects did pick the joint-profit-maximizing outcome number in well over 90 percent of the experiments. Hoffman and Spitzer also conducted several variations of this basic experiment. In a series of "full information" experiments the subjects each knew the other's payoff schedule, while in "partial information" experiments they were told only their own. Second, the number of parties to the dispute was increased in steps from two to three, four, ten, and twenty parties. Finally, the controller was determined by using different methods. Sometimes a coin was flipped, and other times subjects played a preliminary game with the winner of the game earning the right to be the controller. None of these variations made much difference in the basic result: the Coase Theorem predicted the outcome in 93 percent of all experiments. It was even more powerful in large (ten-and twenty-subject) experiments, where it predicted 100 percent of the outcomes.
Hoffman and Spitzer contended that these results produce substantial insights for legal policy, supporting a "presumption in favor of the Coase Theorem."4 In disputes involving substantial numbers of parties (as many as thirty-eight), a court should presume that the parties will bargain to produce an efficient outcome through voluntary agreement. Thus one who contends that bargaining breakdown is likely must produce arguThat would be outcome number 1 in Table 1. 4 See Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests, supra note 2. Two possible sources of concern might substantially limit the applicability of these results. First, the payoffs in the original experiments were quite symmetrical and provided the subjects little ground on which to differentiate themselves. This design feature might ease the formation of bargains and possibly remove any opportunity for divergent strategic behavior (where each subject "sees" a strategy for walking away with the lion's share of the profits). With symmetric positions, each subject might quickly come to realize the futility of any strategic behavior, understanding that the same strategy can be used against him. The central theme of this argument is that, when nonsymmetric payoffs are used, subjects might fail to reach the efficient outcome. Second, the externality between our subjects was entirely folded into a single-dimensio However, many of the conflicts to which these results such as home owners living next to waste-disposal site discomfort.6
Perhaps there is something special that would preven bargains when one of the parties to the dispute might There are three obvious possibilities. First, if only one suffer, the payoffs are asymmetric. The role of symm structure has already been discussed. Second, dependin owns the right, the physical sufferer may put differ externality. If the sufferer owns the right to avoid the ex be paid some money to agree to accept the physical d minimum amount that he would voluntarily accept h accept" (WTA) . If the sufferer does not own the righ comfort, he must pay to avoid the externality. Call thi that the sufferer would pay his "willingness to pay" might differ from one's WTP either because of wealth of various psychological reasons such as strategic behav the value-solicitation technique.7
Third, the process of bargaining over accepting phy particularly the ingestion of noxious gases, liquids, an involve such an affront to dignity as to stymie bargai "dignity hypothesis" is independent of the point conce differing from WTP values. This hypothesis focuse concept itself, and it captures the same idea as is foun joke. Two people meet at a party, and the first asks the second, "Wi have sex with me in exchange for $1,000,000?" The second thinks f minute and then responds, "Yes." The first then counters, "Will y it for $50?" And the second immediately responds, "Of course not, do you think I am?" The first replies, "We have already determined you are. Now the question is price." In other words, there are s things that one is not supposed to sell. In such circumstances, the r to bargain at all would upset the Coase Theorem.
The role of asymmetric payoffs, discussed above, may also inter with the dignity hypothesis. People may feel that agreeing to accept phy cal discomfort when others do not have to agree to the unpleasant ex ence may heighten the affront to dignity. One would be agreeing, i sence, to be part of a class with less dignity. This argument focuses o quality of one's treatment relative to the treatment of others, whereas t first discussion of dignity focused on the absolute quality of treatm For example, residents in the area of Kiev may feel somewhat indign at the prospect of having to drink radioactive water. The affront to dign may be increased, however, when they learn that the residents of cow can drink clean water. The necessity of drinking radioactive w would represent the absolute affront to dignity, while being placed inferior class may heighten the insult.8
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This paper reports results of experiments testing the first and the third hypotheses (asymmetry and the dignity hypothesis) but excluding the second (that WTA and WTP values might be different).
A. Asymmetry
Our experiment that tested the first hypothesis was quite simple, replicating the two-person experiment described above but substituting an asymmetric payoff function. The payoffs are shown in Table 2 . Subjects contracted to the efficient point 100 percent of the time, thereby disposing of the first hypothesis.
B. The Dignity Hypothesis
Constructing a test of the third hypothesis was far trickier. We have found no direct test of the dignity hypothesis in the experimental social psychology literature on which to build. Indeed the last thirty years of Several areas of work seem tangentially relevant. For example, the literature on cognitive dissonance suggests that, if subjects can be led to behave at variance with internal norms (that is, in an "undignified" fashion, for purposes of our work), then subjects will either deny the quality of their acts or revise their internal norms so as to reduce a type of psychic friction.10 However, in these experiments subjects are almost always induced to behave in some fashion, and then the experimenter monitors changes in beliefs, affect, attitude, and the like. These experiments do not create markets and then observe subjects' willingness to bargain over rights.
Many works in experimental social psychology (including some on cognitive dissonance) induce subjects to do undignified things such as agree to be placed in a closet, blindfolded, tied to a chair, and shocked for twenty minutes;" to administer dangerous, high-voltage shocks to another subject who is screaming with pain and demanding to be released;12 to drink bitter quinine solution;13 or to choose to eat caterpillars.14 But none of these experiments observes these choices as the result of explicit, economic bargaining for monetary payment, and none of the me most important to the social psychology work, such as purposefu fusing the subjects about their own preferences, seem to be prese design.
To design our own test of the dignity hypothesis, we were forced to rely heavily on previous experimental work by Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze,15 who devised bidding mechanisms (termed "incentive compatible") for leading subjects to reveal their true WTP and WTA values for holding a one-ounce cup of sucrose octa-acetate (SOA)-a safe but very bitter-tasting, unpleasant liquid-in their mouths for twenty seconds. Each subject in these experiments was allowed to sample a drop or two.
The WTP experiments proceeded, in essence, by asking each subject to state his willingness to pay to avoid tasting the SOA. The four highest bids were accepted by the experimenter, thereby enabling the high bidders to avoid tasting the SOA. (The remaining subjects had to taste the SOA.) But these four high bidders had to pay the experimenter only the amount of the fifth highest bid. Under these circumstances it is in the self-interest of each subject to reveal his true value for tasting the SOA because the size of his bid determines only whether it will be accepted, not how much he will have to pay if it is accepted.16 The WTA experiments were run in the identical fashion, except that subjects were asked to reveal their willingness to accept payment for agreement to taste the SOA, and only the four low bids were accepted. The four low bidders were paid the amount of the fifth lowest bid.
Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze also collected survey data from their subjects regarding their hypothetical WTA and WTP values. Some of the surveys first allowed the subjects to sample a drop or two of the SOA, while others just described the SOA to the subjects. In both types of hypothetical surveys, WTA averaged between $7.00 and $15, but WTP averaged only $3.00-$4.50. In contrast, in the incentive-compatible bidding experiments described in the paragraph above, WTA and WTP values converged to about $4.00. 17 The experiments reported in this paper incorporate the use of SOA into the basic Coase Theorem experiment so as to provide a test with a true negative externality. Most of the basic institutiona the original Coase Theorem experiments are used h the cleanest possible test of Coase's hypothesis in t cal discomfort, uncluttered by degradation of the assumptions.
In all the experiments, subjects bargained face-toof a monitor for more money than most students work in their next-best alternative employment. S lowed, and contracts were in writing and strictly e were made in public. Subjects were not told what t be in choosing a number or in forming contracts. We placed each bargaining group in a separate roo being the only other person present) and randomly to the subjects. The monitor provided the subjects contained in the Appendix. The subjects first read t and then listened as the monitor read then aloud. structions, subjects played a game to determine w right to be the controller. As before, the controller ha whatever outcome number he wished. The other sub persuade the controller to choose another number b or all of his payoff money to the controller.
The instructions revealed the basic design reflecte in When testing the dignity hypothesis, the degree of information possessed by each subject about the prospective experience may be crucial. After all, if the SOA were to taste like an expensive Chardonnay (which it most certainly does not), the decision to taste would involve little affront to dignity. 8 There are many degrees of information that a potential sufferer might have about a particular discomfort, ranging all the way from complete familiarity with the discomfort, to having sampled a bit of the discomfort, to having only had the discomfort described, to confronting the dreaded "unknown unknown." Modeling all these information conditions was well beyond the scope of our investigation. Instead we focused on only two of them. We decided to allow some of our subjects to sample a drop or two of the SOA, while others learned of the SOA only by reading a description in the instructions. Crossing A (sampling or not) with B (sampling or not) produced four variations:
1. Both Sample. This condition models a dispute between an owner of a small house located next to a large apartment complex. The owner of the apartment is about to install a large, noisy air-conditioning unit in a place that will disturb the residents of the house but not the apartment house's owner. During this period of time both the residents of the small house and the owner of the apartment house visit another site where the same type of air-conditioning unit has already been installed and listen to the noise for a minute or two. In this way, both parties will have sampled the noise, but only one of them, the owner of the small house, actually will have to hear it once the air-conditioning unit is installed." 2. A Samples Only. This represents the same conflict described in the paragraph above, except that only the owner of the small house, not the owner of the apartment house, went to another site to hear the same type of air-conditioning unit. The owner of the small hou of the apartment building that the air conditione 3. B Samples Only. This models the same confli tions above, except that only the owner of the heard a similar, already-installed air conditioner. ment building tells the owner of the small house will be very noisy.21
4. Neither Samples. This models the conflict in tions, except that neither the owner of the smal the apartment house has listened to a similar, in another site, and a third party has described the being very noisy.22
In which condition is bargaining breakdown mos pair of arguments suggests that bargaining break maximized when only A samples. First, the digni gets its best chance to prevent bargain formation will be the case in conditions 1 and 2 above, for bitter nature of the SOA. The dignity hypothes knows the truth and is the controller, he will ref (Note that when B is the controller, A is power because his agreement is not needed.) If neither s only guess at its qualities,23 while, if only B samp SOA is not so bad.24
Second, we hypothesize that strategic behavior bargaining breakdown in experiments in which e not both because the obvious asymmetry in the e tunities for mutually inconsistent strategies. Wh predictions from the dignity hypothesis and the metry, we derive an overall prediction that barga 20 The instructions for this case were identical to those in added the sentence "Before the experiment begins participan the bitter liquid" to the end of the second paragraph of Sect 21 The instructions for this case were identical to those in stated, "Before the experiment begins participant B will sam liquid."
22 The instructions for this condition were identical to those that the crucial sentence "Before the experiment begins you bitter liquid" was omitted.
23 We are assuming, in essence, that the subjects are not e active imaginations lead them to fear the SOA experience warrant. 24 We frequently observed this form of behavior in the experiments in which only sampled. greatest when only A samples, least when neither samples, a where between in the other two conditions.25 C. Subjects Subjects were undergraduate economics and management students at the University of Wyoming. They were recruited in class, were told only that they would participate in an economics decision, and were promised $3.00 for participating. Friends were not allowed to participate together. All subjects were inexperienced with this type of experiment. After each experiment we explained the nature and purpose of the experiment and asked them, in the name of "science," not to reveal anything about the experiment to future subjects. Later subjects seemed to be initially naive about the purpose and conduct of the experiment, and there was no time trend in the results.
IV. RESULTS
The most striking aspect of the results is the overwhelming cho number 2, the efficient outcome. In the twenty-two experiments i B was the controller, number 2 was chosen every time. In the ei experiments in which A was the controller, number 2 was chosen times. Thus, in general, using a physical externality does not see interfere with subjects' ability to reach the efficient outcome. In g the dignity hypothesis is rejected, and the Coase Theorem is acce Table 3 summarizes results according to experimental treatment ing how many experiments out of the number possible joint-prof imized when A was the controller.
Our hypothesis was that, when only A sampled, the probability of bargaining breakdown would be maximized. These results, however, provide no support for our hypothesis. This table suggests instead that the treatment in which both A and B sample may be different from the other conditions. However, there are not enough events in that quadrant to be statistically certain. For the remainder of this paper, however, we will assume that there is no difference, in part because our working hypothesis was that bargaining breakdown was most likely when only A sampled, and in that case four out of four bargaining groups chose efficiently. Clearly, only initial, tentative conclusions can be made regarding this point. Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of money between A and B when 25 We will discuss hypotheses about the distribution of money within the discussion of results infra. 18. This is consistent with trigger experiments,26 in whi served, but some controllers w Looking first at the top pane received Coasian theory predic value for choosing number 2. generated by Brookshire, Cou did so. We cannot use either t average accepted as a measure o ment, however, because there vergence to the true WTA. W consistent with the hypotheti Coursey, and Schulze. It also appears that A succeed sampled. This is consistent with ments. The B's who had sampl "not so bad." On the other han cally complain about how horr Turning now to the bottom pa a game with self-interested pa that in eleven of the twenty-t The data also suggest that there is a relation betwe conditions and the empathy of the B's for the A's. and B was the controller, B actually gave up more th three treatments where B was the controller. Those B's who shared when only A sampled the SOA averaged a $3.50 payment to A, but when only B sampled, the sharing B's transferred an average of $5.33. This is in contrast to the case in which A was the controller and only B sampled. In that case, A was able to negotiate for less on average than when A was controller and only A sampled.
Perhaps what is happening in these experiments when only B tastes is that B forms an opinion of the proper WTP and WTA values, which is not affected by any information gained by A. But, having been the only one to taste, B may feel greater responsibility toward the unwitting A. In this case, those controlling B's who do share may actually give up little less than noncontrolling B's when A is controller. In these cases, B tells A that it is not so bad and argues for a smaller payment when A is the controller but, feeling somewhat responsible, is willing to give a larger payment when B is the controller.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATURALLY OCCURRING ENVIRONMENTS
Before we can analyze the implications of our experiment for nonlaboratory settings, we must ask what types of nonlaboratory environments were (or were not) modeled well by our experiment.
A. Applicability of Results
There are two lines of reasoning that would argue again these results to a nonlaboratory setting. First, subjects m differently in the laboratory than they would elsewhere. periments may have failed to capture the essential feature natural settings. Many of the arguments governing the extent results of such laboratory experiments may be applied to n ments have been considered extensively by Hoffman and be only briefly reviewed at this juncture.29
1. Laboratory Effects. What are the most likely laborat our experiments? The subjects might have regarded money they might have had different attitudes toward bargain might have had a different attitude toward tasting the SO ences might have been produced either by important diffe our subject pool and the target population or by observer
Is there any evidence of laboratory effects in the data? T of some of the subjects to share their monetary payoffs some initial concern. We usually presume that people wh friends or family members will behave in a self-interested fa ral settings. Perhaps the frequent sharing behavior indicat were not taking the experiment seriously.
Three insights suggest that this line of argument is mistake should not prevent applying our results to nonlaboratory subjects appeared to take the bargaining and the resulting seriously. Second, recent experimental work has shown t behave in a self-regarding fashion when they independen morally justified the entitlements that the experimenter exercise.30
This work has shown that, if experimenters randomly distribute rights to control a purely monetary externality, the right holders will not exercise those rights to maximize their own profit. Instead the right holders exercise the rights so as to maximize joint profits and then split all money equally with the other subject, thereby "giving away" money. If the experimenter instead distributes the rights by allowing the right holder to both "earn" them and regard the rights as morally justified under a Lockean labor-desert theory, subjects tend to regarding.
The experiments reported in this paper differ from previous work because rights holders are asked to exercise the right to inflict physical discomfort. Subjects may require a greater degree of perceived moral justification before they are willing to exercise such rights in a selfregarding way. It is entirely possible that many of the B's did not feel morally justified to invoke the right to force A to taste the SOA without compensation. Pending some additional work on the circumstances providing moral justification for exercising a right to inflict physical discomfort, we will presume that the non-self-regarding behavior of the subjects does not suggest that the subjects were behaving frivolously.
Third, the Coase Theorem received overwhelming support regardless of whether or not the subjects were self-regarding.31 More than half of the experiments produced self-regarding outcomes when B was the controller, and all of these supported the Coase Theorem by choosing number 2. The Coase Theorem, then, gets strong support in the laboratory from our results.
Despite our strong laboratory support of the Coase Theorem, however, observer effects, attitudes of subjects, and differences between our subject pool and target populations could prevent applying our results to natural settings. Observer effects would be present if subjects were to bargain to efficient outcomes because they were being watched and wished to be thought of as "nice" or "worthy." Most important for our test of the dignity hypothesis, subjects might have been more willing to bargain over something disgusting such as tasting the SOA because they were being observed.
Would we expect this to be true? A number of images from natural settings argue for this observer effect, but others argue against it. In support of this observer effect, consider the "Ugly George Hour of Truth, Sex, and Violence" on CATV in New York City, in which George Urban routinely persuades young, middle-class women to strip off all their clothes in front of a television camera, when few, if any, of these women would otherwise have given George Urban the time of day. In a similar vein, for example, on the "Gong Show" and other television game shows, people debase themselves for money in front of cameras and large studio audiences.
On the other hand, people may be less willing to tolerate obnoxious odors, tastes, and so forth if they are being observed. Con who runs home to clean up his or her house, removing f food with which the person is otherwise content to live b or a date is going to arrive. In sum, there is no single a pr about the observer effect.
Fortunately, regardless of which way this issue is resolved, it will not preclude applying our results to natural settings. Most of the disputes to which our results would apply (such as odors) involve discomforts that must be suffered in public (in the sense that everyone knows you are experiencing the discomfort) and involve public bargaining over settlement of the disputes. Few externalities involving physical discomfort take place in complete secret. Therefore, these observer effects should occur in natural settings as well as in the laboratory.
Attitudes of the subjects toward the experiment might also preclude applying our results to nonlaboratory environments. To the extent that the subjects regarded the duty to taste the SOA as a perverse sort of thrill or recreation and therefore fundamentally different from physical discomforts encountered in the naturally occurring world, our test of the dignity hypothesis would be impeached. Did the subjects regard the experiment as "fun" and bargain over the duty to taste the SOA out of a desire to be sociable? This is a very difficult question to answer, for the bargaining was face-to-face between college students. Our observation of the subjects did not bring to light anything that would directly suggest that this would be a problem. However, we had no control over this sort of attitude variable, nor can we imagine an effective one apart from inflicting physical discomfort so intense that no human-subject review board would ever approve of the experiment. For this reason we emphasize that we have provided a test of only a rather mild form of the dignity hypothesis, but probably about the best test that one could do in the laboratory.32
Differences, if any, between our subject pool and target populations also provide no reason to refrain from using our results. Our subjects tended to be undergraduate students, about twenty years old, who will very soon be adult citizens who may get involved in the types of lawsuits that the Coase Theorem models. Did their relative youth make a difference? Probably not. They seemed to be adept at bargaining, took the experiment very seriously, and routinely bargained to the efficient out-32 The subjects may also have had a different, more permissive attitude toward bargaining because we gave them contract forms and told them that we would enforce bargains, thereby giving implicit approval to the act of bargaining. Previous research by Milgram has shown that people may be willing to commit morally repugnant acts if they are ordered to commit those acts by an experimenter. Milgram, supra note 12. This effect may extend as well to acts that an experimenter indicates are permitted.
come. If we were to expect subjects to become less l efficient outcomes as they grow older, we would hav our results. But why expect this? In the long run, pe to learn that bargaining breakdown is costly for ev learn to be proficient at making deals. Indeed a la subjects, having come to the University of Wyoming backgrounds, probably have experienced more of th ated with auctioning and bargaining than have other 2. Experimental Treatment Effects on the Effic policymaker should refrain from applying our result ting if the essential features of that setting were not in design. There are four important sources of bargain were not incorporated into our design.
First, we excluded most sources of transactions cos parties together, modeling only two parties to the d subjects for their time, and providing standard form perfectly enforced. This eliminated most sources of natural world.33 Examples include situations in which know each other, there are hundreds of thousands of pute, bargaining is very costly, or the parties are u agreements will be enforced. The problem of acid-r vides the quintessential example where all these elem some extent. Many polluters' activities combine to p ronmental blight across thousands of miles and acros ders. Many other examples of large-scale pollution a these elements, and our results should not be applie As we explained in our introduction, previous wor with purely monetary externalities even moderately l large as thirty-eight) can be expected to bargain eff have to run additional experiments to be certain tha carry over to externalities with physical discomfort, but of this paper we will assume that it would.
Second, we excluded most informational deficienci bargaining breakdown by making all payoffs, includi thereof) to taste the SOA, common knowledge. The 33 We also eliminated one feature of the naturally occurring wo transactions costs, that is, the iterative nature of some conflicts. Re when conflicts are repeated between the same parties over and ove ation may be increased. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of C M. Kreps 3. Distributional Considerations. Can we expect the willingness of the B's to share their money and provide a form of voluntary compensation to the A's to apply in natural settings? If so, then a court might be able to assign a property right to a polluter and worry little about the equity of the situation, depending on the polluter to provide voluntary compensation to the victims. Our results suggest that in two-person, faceto-face bargaining situations, such as those over neighborhood nuisances, the parties to the bargain might be able to resolve such equity considerations themselves.
Unfortunately, there are many reasons to expect that behavior will be different in natural settings involving impersonal bargaining and bargaining over market transactions. First, natural settings would often involve disputes where the polluter would not have to watch his victim suffer. More important, polluters and sometimes victims will often be corporations, which are subject to the discipline of competitive markets. Any management that tried to pursue a truly charitable policy (and not merely one that traded short-run profits for long-run goodwill that translates into higher long-run profits) would depress the share value of its corporation and raise its costs, thereby risking shareholder displeasure and implicitly inviting takeover by new management. Therefore, in the long run, managements that do not try to give away substantial amounts of money will probably be more successful.
B. Implications for Legal Policy 1. Nuisance Law. The most obvious application of our results would be to legal doctrines governing disputes over pollution among moderate numbers of actors. For example, when neighboring landowners create externalities that interfere with each other's "use and enjoyment" of the land, the law of nuisance determines the rights and remedies of the parties.39 These interfering uses might be, for example, an oil refinery that 39 Analogous problems between a landlord and his tenants, such as the landlord creating a stench that annoys several of his tenants, is controlled by the "covenant of quiet enjoyment," which, under certain circumstances, regards the landlord's behavior as a breach of his relationship with the tenants. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 266-83 (1981). The discussion of choice of remedies based on efficiency concerns, at least when the rental contract does not allocate rights between the parties, would parallel the discussion in the text. produces odors that bother neighbors,40 an apartment buil extremely noisy air-conditioning unit that disturbs a singleing next door,41 a dog kennel that produces both bad od noises that disturb the landowners in the immediate vicinity,42 disposal site.43 In all these cases the court must choose betw tive remedies and damages remedies. We will use the exa noisy air-conditioning unit in the discussion that follows.
There are two extreme forms of injunctive remedies.
(1) Th owner's right; that is, the apartment owner may make as mu his air-conditioning unit as he wishes, and the single family his voluntary agreement to reduce the noise. (2) The single fa that is, the single family may obtain an order from the court di apartment owner to make no noise with his air conditioner ment owner must secure the voluntary agreement of the sin be released from the obligation of silence.
The law of nuisance actually would tend to use a rule that l combination of the two above rules: the apartment owner ma with impunity up to some critical level, and, if the apartm makes more than the critical level of noise, the single famil an order of the court directing the apartment owner to red down to the critical level. This means the court would apply the critical level and rule 2 thereafter. By choosing the critical l priately, a court could increase the efficiency of its decision There are also two damages remedies. (a) The apartment ow that is, the single family may obtain an order directing th owner to reduce the noise level, but the single family must p ment owner all increased expenses from reducing the noise.
family's right; that is, the apartment owner may make as much likes but must compensate the single family for all damage from Traditional wisdom has noted that the risks associated with tive and damages remedies depend on whether one can de parties to form contracts and hence "correct" any mistakes t might make. If the parties cannot be trusted to make contrac injunctive and damages remedies threaten large effici tive remedies risk large efficiency losses if the court gra to the party who values it least and if the parties cannot the rights by contract. Damages remedies might prod losses if the court charges too little (or too much) for thereby inducing too much (or too little) of the nuisa If bargaining breakdown is extremely unlikely, a c either an injunctive remedy or a damages remedy with large efficiency losses; the parties will correct the cou contract. In such circumstances the court should choose between remedies on the basis of minimizing administrative costs, that is, the sum of the costs of fashioning and enforcing the remedy plus the costs of bargaining to correct any errors. In any particular case, damages or an injunction might be better. However, if we make three basic assumptions, injunctive remedies will be preferred. First, assume that the costs of bargaining to correct the court's mistakes will be very similar for injunctive and damages entitlements because the contracts will involve the same partie bargaining over very similar issues. Second, assume that the court has about the same chance of making substantial errors with injunctive or damages remedies.45 Third, assume that evaluating damages is mor costly and time consuming than is getting an injunction, for the court must take and assess particularized evidence on harms suffered by each plain tiff. Under such circumstances, injunctive remedies will be preferred to damages remedies because damages remedies have higher administrative costs. When a court is faced with such a situation, and it often will be, i should choose an injunctive remedy, that is, rule 1 or 2. In terms of our example above, if the court were to find that the noise was a nuisance, i should choose rule 2, but if the noise was not a nuisance, it should choos rule 1.
Our results have little to say, however, about disputes involving very large numbers of parties or risk of death. For example, the oil refinery mentioned above might produce pollutants that not only smell terrible bu that also greatly increase the risk of cancer to thousands of people. In such a situation, a court may presume that there is a substantial risk o bargaining breakdown. If the refinery's noxious fumes constitute a nuisance and the court grants the neighboring landowners injunctive entitle ments, it might have to close down, for it would not likely be able to secure the consent of all the thousands of right holders that would be needed for continued operation. If the court were to grant the refinery an injunctive right instead, strategic problems would likely st of the adjoining landowners to buy the refinery's coo pollution.
These considerations might prompt a court to choose damages remedies instead. If the refinery is a nuisance, it would be required to pay the landowners all damages from the pollution.46 But if the court were to decide instead that the refinery is not a nuisance, a damages remedy becomes more problematic. For example, the court might set a price schedule for pollution reductions and then let the landowners work out for themselves whether to purchase an injunction against some of the pollution. To do so they would also have to decide how much each would contribute to the total purchase price. The allocation of payment to reduce the risk of death might involve coordination and strategic problems, leading to bargaining breakdown.
To get around these problems, the court would have to invent some method for determining the marginal benefit that each landowner would receive from the purchase of cleaner air. But the courts do not traditionally concern themselves with estimating the marginal benefits accruing to individual plaintiffs in such suits. Moreover, determination of marginal benefits is subject to notorious practical and theoretical problems associated with the individual incentive to strategically misrepresent in hopes of reducing individual assessments.47 These problems might prompt the court to find the refinery to be a nuisance and grant neighboring landowners a damages entitlement.48 2. Inalienability. In many circumstances the law refuses to allow or enforce consensual transfers of rights even where it allows particular individuals to have those rights in the first place. Obvious examples include the law's prohibitions against prostitution and against an individual's resale of prescription drugs. In both cases the law will enforce the individual's rights to use the resources in quest services there are laws against rape and sexual a prescription drugs the law of theft protects the and take his lawfully prescribed medications. A recent writing has focused on the justifications f concentrating on arguments grounded in utility,49
But for our purposes, the most important justif centers on personhood and the loss of dignity. transactions in which the transfer of the rights them that the parties to the bargain and perha would suffer by the degradation of our true dignit be a whole person. 52 The most famous recent example of such legi dianapolis, which passed a city regulation proh pornography.53 Pornography was defined to be plicit subordination of women, whether in pictu includes one or more" specific elements of domi Trafficking included the "production, sale, exhi pornography.55 Such an ordinance constituted a cause those who would have voluntarily perform not legally distribute their performances by wo This restriction is made regardless of the appar performance, the willingness of others to view, and the le tending to engage in the depicted behaviors.56
Although the ordinance was passed by a rather unusual included fundamentalist Christians, radical Right politician feminist left-wingers, we will analyze the Indianapoli though it was passed for the reasons recounted by one of Catharine A. MacKinnon.57 She argues that those who are ciety create the concepts and ideas by which we all come understand the world. To the extent that phenomena can ciated or understood within the accepted epistemology, t will be ignored or misunderstood. To MacKinnon, women tion and debasement in our society is propped up and rei epistemology of sex that is propagated by pornography. B raphy (as defined in the Indianapolis statute) teaches that be hurt and humiliated, particularly within sexual relatio some women) come to regard women as masochists and lea pret sexual domination and humiliation as natural and he played out in all areas of life. For example, sexual assault preted to be foreplay, rape is misinterpreted to be love, de nity to women to work is misinterpreted as protecting the w so on. To break the epistemological and political cycle of repression, and humiliation, MacKinnon drafted the antip dinance described above and then worked for its passage.
Do our results provide any implications for the debate ov ity, at least to the extent that inalienable rights are justified dignity, oppression, and domination? We think not for i pornography, although for other (less topical) issues they plain our conclusions, we will sketch the steps in an argu needed to connect our results to normative conclusions r alienability.
56 Do not, at this stage, confuse the legality of actually engaging in behaviors such as rape, sodomy, and so on with the legality of pretending to engage in those behaviors for the purpose of performance.
57 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 1 (1985) . We apologize in advance for the shortcomings of our encapsulation of MacKinnon's argument. We have attempted to boil down a rather complex seventy-page published article into one paragraph, and much must be lost in the process.
58 Radin argues against allowing prostitution in similar terms. She claims that, if we all were to start selling sexual services instead of engaging in sex out of love, we would learn to think of sex in monetary terms, and the link between sex and love would be broken, leaving us all personally warped and degraded. To avoid this result, Radin argues, the law should not enforce contracts for sexual services. In this way, sex becomes "inalienable." See Radin, supra note 52. The first assumption corresponds to theories about how "true" preferences motivate observed behavior.59 The only change is that the first assumption links their behavior to true beliefs about what is morally permissible to trade for money.
The second assumption requires only that conceptions of personhood and dignity help to shape the conceptions of subjects as to what is morall permissible. No explicit internal dialogue using these concepts is required to justify this assumption, however. As long as subjects have this type o concept, regard it as important, and implicitly refer to it, the assumptio will be satisfied.
The second and third assumptions together deny any significant role for "false consciousness" arguments. These arguments contend, in general, that social pressures so mold and warp the psychological process of people, particularly those living in capitalist societies, that they no longer know their "true" desires or interests. They also claim that honestly held preferences for racism, sexism, selfish materialism, and so forth are strong items of evidence for the inability to know one's true preferences and interests. People who have not been warped would not want such things. As a result, these arguments contend, even honest preferences of the "wrong" sort should be given no weight either in treating individuals or in formulating policies for society. Only if people exhibit the right types of preferences-that is, egalitarian, unselfish, antiracist, antisexist, and communitarian--should we regard their preferences as "true."
In particular, the second and third assumptions rule out MacKinnon's arguments about the epistemology of debasement and the misunderstanding of phenomena that do not fit into the prevailing set of approved concepts. MacKinnon's arguments form, in essence, a false consciousness based on cognitive error.
In contrast, the second and third assumptions allow that peo do know, on average, their true preferences. As applied to M argument, the second and third assumptions state that, in gen can differentiate between that which is and that which is not ing and can distinguish between relationships between the sex dignity and relationships that do not.6" The third assumption the position of conventionalists (also known as relativists), w that there is a strong link between the real beliefs of indiv morality and the moral truths that those beliefs describe.61 T tion also rebuffs those who believe that values and facts are separate and that values, such as a healthy personality, exist from any factual contexts in which they are applied.
We find our three-assumption link between behavior and plausible, although by no means certain, when applied to disp ing physical discomfort, such as the example of the noisy air discussed in the previous section. And for people like us, our d some evidence of what is needed for true dignity in such situ results, based on a sample of eighty subjects, suggest tha healthy college students are willing to taste something nasty threatening) if they are paid enough to do so. On the basis of tion we would infer that it is more likely than not that a hea with full regard for his dignity, would be willing to sell the d bad things. We would suggest that anyone who would argue inalienable the right to refrain from tasting bad (but not lifethings should bear the burden of proof.
How far can we generalize this result? It probably extends t endure other unpleasant sensations. We therefore suggest th burden of proof should attach to making inalienable the righ from similar harms, such as listening to loud air conditione owner should probably be allowed to sell an adjoining landown to build a large, ugly structure that will block a beautiful vie below. People also should be allowed to agree to endure un noises and odors, such as those emanating from neigh or garbage dumps, in exchange for money.
However, as applied to performing pornography, as dianapolis ordinance, we can take no such position on experiments. First, we suspect that agreeing to taste be sodomized while someone films the experience are things. The routine willingness of our subjects to ag implies nothing about their willingness to agree to th if some of our subjects would agree to perform porn thing about which we have our doubts), we would be as easily the false-consciousness arguments. Perhaps, as MacKinnon claims, epistemological impediments would prevent people from seeing the true nature of actions, or maybe some warping experience would have produced "false" preferences in our subjects. We take no stand on these possibilities in this paper except to note that they seem to be substantial enough concerns to prevent us from making the link between our results and any normative conclusions about pornography.
We repeat one last time a qualification that we have repeated throughout this paper: we have provided a mild test of the dignity hypothesis. We express no opinion on the basis of our results about whether people should be allowed to endure great danger, such as increased risk of cancer from a leaking toxic waste dump, or extreme humiliation, such as prostitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our results clearly dispose of asymmetric payoffs as a source of bar gaining breakdown and to some extent dispose of the dignity hypothes as well. The Coase Theorem has been reaffirmed, and courts should choose legal rights and remedies in many situations under a presumption that parties can and will exhaust all gains from trade. However, we have a strong hunch that tasting SOA is qualitatively different from risking death or engaging in much more degrading conduct, so our results cannot be extended to such issues.62 We invite you to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. Part of the decision-making process may involve tasting a displeasurable stimulus. This stimulus is not harmful for human consumption. In fact, the stimulus is a sucrose derivative. However, some taste or oral discomfort may result if you taste the substance because of its bitter qualities. Efforts will be made to shorten any such period of discomfort by providing water for rinsing your mouth. There is a risk to diabetics; no diabetics may participate. No other predictable health risks are foreseen.
This experiment was developed to explore how individuals, such as yourself, react to natural hazards such as contamination of water supplies. Since we obviously cannot use contaminated water in the experiment, the bitter, unharmful liquid is substituted.
You are free to withdraw from participation in this study at any time without prejudice. If you decide to participate in the experiment, you may earn a considerable amount of money. This will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. Your signature at the bottom of this page indicates that you have decided to participate and have read the above information. You may deny consent if desired.
The nature and general purpose of the experimental procedure have been explained to me. The experiments are authorized to proceed on the understanding that I may terminate participation at any time. I understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental procedure, but I believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both known and potential This experiment requires that one decision be made. T choosing a number. The number chosen will corresp amount, which will be paid to you at the end of this ex person A may have to hold a one-ounce cup of the bitter liq for twenty seconds. The number, corresponding payoffs taste the bitter liquid are tabulated on page 6 of these instr only the value of each number to you (under column A), b number to the other participant (under column B). Befor you will sample a few drops of the bitter liquid.
Before the decision, both participants A and B will play this game earns the right to be designated the "control preliminary game are as follows.
Above is a picture of seventeen vertical hash marks. Eac turn, cross out one, two, three, or four hash marks. After as many hash marks as he or she wishes, it is the other p one, two, three, or four hash marks. The game continues un been crossed out. The person who crosses out the last has For simplicity, the person who goes first will be the person appear first in the dictionary. A must cross out the last mark on his turn, so A loses the game, and B has earned the position of controller.
If you win the game and are designated the controller, you may, if you wish, choose any number you like by filling out the form on page 7 and giving it to the monitor. However, if you lose the preliminary game and are not designated controller, you may still attempt to influence the controller to form a joint agreement and choose some other number. In order to induce the controller to reach an acceptable joint agreement, you may offer to pay part of your earnings to the controller.
Example
Assume that A wins the preliminary game and earns the position of the controller. Assume also the following payoffs for A and B. (These payoffs are different from the ones you will have in the actual experiment.)
